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War. My only reservations here are essentially wishes for more: more on the development of the 
Canadian story; more space devoted to the activities and outlooks of that mass of Indian immigrants 
who were neither leaders nor elite. 
There is much here for the specialist, too, for whom this must become a central reference 
work. fur the United States, this is the only detailed, contemporary historical monograph on the gen-
eral situation of the early Indian migrants available. But this is faint praise, for it is more than this. 
Passage from India has digested a massive amount of data derived from what has evidently been at 
least a fifteen-year quest: govenunent records, at least fifty American court cases, the historical me-
dia, academic commentary and even a bit of oral history. It, thus, provides a host of new factual in-
sights to anyone working in the field of Asian North American history or early twentieth-century race 
relations. Although American-centered, there is even a fair amount of new material on Canada. In-
deed, though someone who perhaps knows the Canadian scene as well as anyone, I was often sur-
prised at how much new there was for me in this book, especially on U.S.-Canadian government 
relations. 
Passage from India is of course neither perfect nor all-encompassing. After 1914, it is essen-
tially an American history with few references to the Canadian situation. As such, while it presents 
a number of powerful parallels in Canadian and American reactions to Indian migrants before the 
World War, it does not show the many differences in these responses which arose thereafter. Indeed, 
its coverage of Canada (save for inter-governmental relations) is somewhat weak throughout, and it 
does not specifically reference much of the academic literature which has arisen in Canada over the 
past decade (e.g. Doreen lndra's and my Continuous Journey: A Social History of South Asians in 
CatUJiln, McClelland & Stewart, 1985~ Moreover, this is not an especially theoretical book. Theory 
occasionally comes in, as in the discussion of why it was primarily Sikhs who came rather than other 
Indians (25-27), or in accounting for their subsequent geographical distribution in California (36). 
Jensen also adequately describes but does not fully explain the wide range of discriminatory practices 
faced by Indian migrants in California, save in reference to now-traditional arguments of the '~ian 
menace"; the whole book might have benefitted from more comparative race relation theory and from 
more comparative material on the South Asian diaspora elsewhere in the world. It also becomes 
somewhat theoretical in its effective presentation of the wider implications of Indian naturalization 
struggles in America ( ch. 12). This book is stuffed full of facts and a few, inevitably, are wrong. As 
Canadian examples, there were not 2,500 Indians in British Columbia in 1903 (60) but rather only 
a handful; it is very unlikely that 80 percent of early immigrants mortgaged land in order to pay for 
passage (26); Indian immigration continued to be a very cootentious issue in Canada after the 1908 
ban, despite Jensen's conclusion otherwise (82); Indians got the vote in British Columbia in 1947, 
not in 1938 (276). 
Stylistically, this book it quite well-written and very readable with only a few troublesome dis-
coonected historical threads, and virtually no typos. The text is well referenced and is augmented with 
a reasonably comprehensive index and a bibliography which rates "good" for America, "basic" for 
Canada. I have no hesitancy in recommending it to a wide audience. 
* * * 
Norman Buchignani 
University of Lethbridge 
William Kaplan- Everything That Floats- Pat Sullivan, Hal Banks, and the Seamen's Unions 
of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. Pp. 241. 
The cover of this book proclaims that it recounts "one of the most infamous chapters in the 
history of the Canadian labour movement." The infamy of Hal Banks and his Seafarers' International 
Union (SIU) is indisputable. Brought in from the United States by shipping companies, with the 
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collaboration of the Canadian government, to supplant the militant, communist-led Canadian 
Seamen's Union (CSU) during its 1949 strike, the SIU used violence and brutality to smash the CSU 
pickets. Through "sweetheart" deals with the compagnies, and with the acquiescence and even 
assistance of the government in illegal actions, the SIU was able to destroy the CSU. The Trades and 
Labour Congress (TLC), despite American Federation of Labor (AR..) pressure, had earlier sup-
ported its affiliate, the CSU, against the SIU raid. In 1949, the 1LC reversed its position and expelled 
the CSU and, in 1951 , permitted the affiliation of the SIU. 
Banks and the SIU thus appeared to have become fully accepted within the Canadian labour 
movement. However, his corrupt practices, the use ofthe notorious "do not ship" list to blacklist 
thousands of sailors who might oppose his control of the union, and the vicious beatings suffered by 
SOire of his adversaries soon caused Hal Banks to become an embarassment to the government, and 
an even greater embarassment to a labour movement seeking public support. SIU efforts to expand 
its power also resulted in jurisdictional quarrels with other unions. This led, in 1962, to the Norris 
Commission, to the placing of the SIU and other maritime unions under trusteeship and, eventually, 
to the conviction of Banks for conspiracy to assault. The release of Banks on bail, his escape to the 
United States, and the fruitless efforts of Canadian authorities to obtain his extradition added farce 
and the suggestion of political scandal to the story. 
William Kaplan's telling of the story of Hal Banks in the latter half of his book covers most 
of the well known events. However, Kaplan's explanation of the roots of SIU corruption and violence 
is weak and unconvincing. The reason for this is that, in his biased treatment of the CSU in the first 
part of the book, he fully accepts the Cold War line that a communist-led union should have no right 
to exist. Destroying the CSU, he believes, was justified; it was only the illegality of the methods and 
the nature of the instrument used that were wrong; and even the initial behaviour of the SIU thugs 
could have been forgiven and forgotten if Banks had been satisfied to settle into quiet trade unionism. 
What Kaplan does not seem to understand is that the SIU, established by violence and illegality, could 
not subsequently operate without such tactics. Kaplan holds that communists had no valid place in 
union leadership, but cannot refute clear evidence that the CSU leaders had strong support from the 
union's membership, so that the destruction of the CSU in such a manner precluded any possibility 
of its destroyer operating democratically. 
Historical analysis of communist-led unions in Canada and of the process by which the com-
munist influence was destroyed is in an early stage of development. Nevertheless, it is extraordinary 
to read today such a simplistic and red-baiting account of the CSU. Kaplan's attacks of the union come 
straight from Cold War rlletoric: the communists were bad union leaders because they were undemo-
cratic, and inadmissable because they had a political agenda imposed by the Soviet Union and were 
not primarily concerned with "bread and butter" unionism. 
The evidence Kaplan presents to establish the undemocratic nature of the CSU leadership is 
quite insignificant, drawn mainly from the testimony of Pat Sullivan, the CSU leader who defected 
from the CP and the CSU. It primarily consists of the revelation that Communist Party members 
planned the tactics they would follow at union conventions "secretly in advance at a party 'fraction' 
meeting" (18). Factional groups of all types meet separately in many organizations without this being 
regarded as inimical to democracy. In the parliamentary system of government, it is even regarded 
as a strong bulwark of democracy. Yet, simply because the communists planned and co-ordinated 
their activities in the union, Kaplan regards this as evidence that there was no democracy in the CSU. 
But it is not really evidence on which Kaplan relies for his claim that the communists acted undemo-
cratically, it is an implicit argument: the Soviet Union was undemocratic; the Canadian CP supported 
the Soviet Union; hence, the communist leaders of the CSU must have been undemocratic. 
With this preformed conviction, Kaplan ignores the testimony of most former members of the 
CSU that it was a very democratic and decentralized union. Communist leadership in unions was usu-
ally won through militant tactics and great emphasis on rank-and-file control, hence, they were almost 
invariably much less dependent on bureaucratic control over union memberships than were other un-
ion leaders. Kaplan appears to believe that bureaucratic control is democracy, so long as it is wielded 
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by non-communists and follows certain formal rules. The "democratic" solution to the problem of 
the CSU that he argues would have avoided all the trouble was that the TLC should, in 1948, have 
"placed the CSU under trusteeship and, through supervised rank-and-file elections, turned it over 
to the control of its members", even though it had been "a strong militant trade union organization 
protecting and enhancing the rights of its members" (53), and though he can present absolutely no 
evidence that there had been anything undemocratic about the election of CSU officers. 
The core of Kaplan's hostile account of the CSU is not the question of democracy but his un-
substantiated claim that CSU policies were politically motivated and inimical to the true interests of 
the membership. "Canadian seamen were being used in the interests of the Soviet Union" (65~ This 
is asserted, not proven or even coherently argued. As Kaplan himself shows, the steamship compa-
nies frequently broke agreements with the union and established labour laws and, in 1949, did so 
with the active collaboration of the government in signing with the SIU. Yet, this weighs little with 
Kaplan in comparison with the iniquity of the CSU in attempting to deny a union crew to a ship carry-
ing arms to Chaing Kai Shek, in 1948, the one overtly political CSU action he can establish. The ev-
idence clearly seems to be that the CSU deep-sea strike of 1949, in which the union was destroyed, 
was forced upon the union leadership by the attacks of the companies and the government and by the 
spontaneous militancy of the CSU membership. There is no reason to suppose that a strike was im-
posed on the membership by the CP in the interests of the Soviet Union. Yet, Kaplan asserts it was, 
without any credible explanation. The TLC abandonment of the seamen's union was only wrong in 
coming so late, but the strike "was an enormous act of betrayal" ( 64 ). 
The question of whether the government's assistance in the destruction of the CSU was mo-
tivated by a desire to facilitate the dismantling of the Canadian deep-sea merchant fleet with little out-
cry is dismissed by Kaplan with no discussion. Also not discussed is the relationship of the overthrow 
of communist influence in seamen's unions to the equally undemocratic, if less violent, process by 
which this occurred in other unions. Such issues are crucial to an understanding of the transformation 
of the Canadian union movement in this period. No light is cast on them by Kaplan, however, whose 
biased views seem to preclude elementary respect for the historical evidence, and whose opinion that 
only the narrowest form of business unionism has validity is in itself profoundly historical. 
* * * 
Michael Earle 
Dalhousie University 
Georges-Emile Lapalme - Pour une politique. Le programme de Ia Revolution tranquil/e. Montreal: 
VLB Eruteur, 1988. Pp. 353 . 
In many ways, How a Liberal Became a Quebec Neo-nationalist would be a far more reveal-
ing title to this collection of policies written by Georges-Emile Lapalme during the summer of 1959 
as his party prepared impatiently for the next provincial election. This set of policies, which formed 
the basis of the Federation liberale du Quebec's platform in the June 1960 election, reflected accu-
rately the trials and tribulations of Lapalme during his time as leader of the Liberal Party, 1950-1958. 
The reader is provided an insider's view of what it was like to grapple with the growing ideological 
ferment taking root in Quebec society. 
Pour une politique encapsulates the eclectic and tension-ridden juxtaposition of old and new 
liberal ideas with the growing preoccupation of the emerging new middle class with the survival and 
development of the franco!Xtone majority of Quebec. In a very real sense, then, this document con-
stitutes a blue print of the Quiet Revolution that would preoccupy and alter in irrevocable ways 
Quebec and Canada over the next three decades. Oaude Corbo maintains in his preface that publish-
ing Pour une politique redresses an injustice to the author. While partially revealing, this explanation 
certainly does not constitute the primary reason for making this work accessible to a larger 
